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Banking Markets
Jith Jayaratne and Christine Hall
The consolidation rate in the Federal Reserve’s Second District banking markets generally 
outpaced the national average between 1989 and 1994. Nevertheless, these banking markets
remain relatively unconcentrated, with midsized banks increasing their market share at the
expense of large banks.
In August 1995, Chemical Banking Corporation and
Chase Manhattan Corporation announced plans to
merge. This merger—the largest in the history of U.S.
banking—has created the nation’s biggest banking
institution. The announcement marked the high point in
a year of an unusually large number of mega-mergers.
In all, 15 percent of U.S. depository institutions with
more than $10 billion in assets—institutions once con-
sidered almost untouchable because of their size—
agreed to sell during 1995 (SNL Securities 1996). This
current merger wave continues the trend toward bank
consolidation initiated by branching deregulation and
thrift failures in the 1980s.
Bank consolidation may be beneficial if larger
banks are more efficient than smaller banks. Moreover,
consolidation may create a more stable banking system
by enabling banks  to extend their branch networks over
a wider geographic area and thus to reduce their depen-
dence on any one sector of the economy. However,
consolidation has its costs. In particular, it raises con-
cerns about the competitiveness of banking markets.
Highly concentrated banking markets—where a few
large institutions dominate—are less likely to be com-
petitive, and decreased competition pushes up the cost
of banking services to customers.
How much has the banking industry consolidated
recently and how has that consolidation affected com-
petition in banking markets?  In this edition of Current
Issues, we examine recent consolidation trends among
depository institutions (commercial banks and thrifts)
in the Federal Reserve’s Second District. Specifically,
we look at changes in several measures of market con-
centration from 1989 to 1994 in the District’s five
largest banking markets: Albany, Buffalo, Metro 
New York–New Jersey, Rochester, and Syracuse.1
We find that measured concentration increased sig-
nificantly after 1989, with the rate of consolidation in
four markets outpacing the national average. This trend
was driven not only by bank mergers but also by thrift
failures and the withdrawal of several large New York
City institutions from the upstate New York banking
markets. Still, despite this dramatic trend, all of these
markets except Buffalo remain less concentrated than
the average urban market nationwide. Moreover, we
find that midsized commercial banks are gaining mar-
ket share at the expense of larger banks in most markets,
suggesting that large banks are facing stiff competition.
The degree to which local deposits are concentrated
in a few large banks is, to be sure, only one indicator of
the competitiveness of markets. For example, this mea-
sure tells us little about the competition for corporate
trust and other custodial services, which have national
or statewide markets and can be provided by banks
lacking extensive branch networks and deposit funds.
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concentration is a reliable proxy for competition in
retail banking services such as checking and small
business lending. For example, all else equal, banks in
highly concentrated markets are found to offer lower
interest rates on retail deposits than banks in less con-
centrated local markets (Berger and Hannan 1989).
Thus, local market deposit concentration measures con-
tinue to be a useful index of banking competition. 
Increased Concentration in the Second District 
To determine the degree of concentration in a local
banking market, we examine two measures of concen-
tration. One measure is the number of depository insti-
tutions in a market, which simply conveys the number
of choices available to consumers. Another, more infor-
mative measure is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI), used by federal bank regulatory agencies and
the Department of Justice to determine excessive mar-
ket concentration (see box). The HHI reflects not only
the number of depository institutions in a market but
also their relative sizes. Higher values of this measure
signify higher levels of concentration. In particular,
under guidelines established by the Department of
Justice to review mergers, HHIs over 1800 indicate
markets that are “highly concentrated.”  
Both measures of market concentration—the num-
ber of depository institutions and the HHI—indicate
that Second District banking markets became more
concentrated between 1989 and 1994 (Table 1). The
HHIs in the District increased substantially over these
five years, rising at a faster rate than the national aver-
age in four markets, with Albany experiencing the
largest increase in concentration: 61 percent. Despite
these sizable increases in the HHI, in 1994 all markets
except Buffalo remained less concentrated than the
average national metropolitan statistical area (MSA), as
indicated by the level of the HHI.
In each market except Syracuse, the number of com-
mercial banks and thrifts declined between 1989 and
1994. Buffalo saw the largest decline in the number of
depository institutions (19 percent) and the Metro 
New York–New Jersey market experienced the smallest
reduction (3 percent). The overall reduced number of
competitors likely contributed to the increase in con-
centration as measured by the HHI.
Factors Leading to Higher Concentration 
We trace much of the increase in concentration to three
specific events:  thrift failures, commercial bank or
thrift mergers, and the withdrawal of the money center
banks from the upstate New York markets.2
The five markets experienced significant numbers of
mergers and thrift failures during the period. Of the
markets’ 493 depository institutions in 1989, 55 
(11.2 percent) were eliminated by mergers and 52 
(10.5 percent) by thrift failures (Table 2, Panel A). If we
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Under the provisions of the 1966 Bank Merger Act,
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York reviews all
proposed bank mergers and acquisitions for viola-
tions of antitrust regulations. The Bank is expected to
identify mergers that would allow a few banks to
dominate a market or, more specifically, to increase
prices of products without facing competition. 
For its antitrust review of mergers, the Bank
requires a measure of market concentration. The first
step in measuring the degree of concentration in
banking markets is to identify the markets. The Bank
has defined fifteen Second District banking markets.
Typically, these markets include metropolitan statisti-
cal areas (MSAs) and surrounding counties that have
substantial commuting interchanges with the MSAs.
Areas with significant commuting interchanges are
considered economically integrated.   
For each of the markets identified, the Bank con-
structs a measure of market concentration. The stan-
dard measure used is the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI), which is determined by calculating the
percentage of deposits held by each depository insti-
tution in a market, then squaring these numbers and
summing the results. The HHI indicates the extent to
which a few banks may dominate a market. It ranges
from 0 to 10000, with the latter indicating a monop-
oly market. Conversely, when a market is highly frag-
mented, with each bank holding a very small share of
total deposits, the HHI is close to zero. 
Under the Justice Department’s merger guidelines,
mergers that result in an HHI at or above 1800 (equiv-
alent to the presence of approximately six equal-sized
banks) and increase the HHI by 200 points require
further scrutiny. Nevertheless, mergers that fail the
preliminary HHI screen are not necessarily denied
approval by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Instead, regulators look to other competition-related
factors that may not be reflected in the HHI screens,
such as the potential entry into the market by other
banks. Bank mergers that pass the HHI screen are pre-
sumed to raise no antitrust concerns.
Antitrust Review:  How the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Defines Banking Markets and Concentrationuse the number of depository institutions as the relevant
measure of market concentration for individual mar-
kets, we see that thrift failures did more to increase
concentration than mergers in Buffalo and Rochester,
while mergers had a bigger impact in the other markets.
Of course, counting the number of institutions elim-
inated is only one way to measure the relative impact of
mergers and thrift failures. To reach a clearer under-
standing of these effects, we also look at the size of
failing and merged institutions. If failing thrifts were
larger in size than merged institutions, failures most
likely had a bigger impact on market concentration.
Using the HHI, we see that thrift failures contributed
more than mergers to increased concentration in
Buffalo, Rochester, and Syracuse; mergers had a
greater impact on the HHI in the Albany and Metro
New York–New Jersey markets (Table 2, Panel A).
Withdrawals of New York City depository institu-
tions from the upstate New York markets also reduced
the number of competitors in these areas.3 Several large
institutions pulled out between 1989 and 1994, con-
tributing to the increase in upstate market concentra-
tion. The 60 percent decline in the number of banking
offices held by five select institutions in these markets
is especially notable (Table 2, Panel B).4 Bank of 
New York and Dime Savings completely withdrew from
the upstate markets, and Chemical largely ended its
operations in these markets.  
Overall, thrift failures contributed as much as bank
mergers to increased market concentration. The abnor-
mally large number of thrift failures in the early part of
the 1989-94 period suggests that the increase in con-
centration in the Second District markets observed over
this period was unusually pronounced. Withdrawal of
New York City institutions from upstate markets proba-
bly had the greatest impact on the Rochester and
Syracuse areas, where some of these institutions had a
significant market presence. 
Concentration in Commercial Banking Markets
So far, we have treated thrifts comparably to commer-
cial banks. The only concession to their differences has
been to give thrifts’deposits less weight when calculat-
ing the overall HHI for depository institutions (see
notes to Tables 1 and 2). However, important reasons
exist for assessing trends in the commercial banking
market apart from the thrift industry. For instance,
because the commercial banking industry is much
larger, trends there will tend to be more important for
assessing competition in markets for retail deposits and
lending. Moreover, we are concerned about competition
for a wide variety of banking services, and commercial
banks generally offer a fuller array of loan and deposit
products than do thrifts. 
When we examine only commercial banks, we see
that consolidation over the 1989-94 period was in fact
modest (Table 3). Here, the picture is very different
from that given by Table 1, which presented trends
among all depository institutions (commercial banks
and thrifts). Although the total number of depository
institutions decreased in all markets other than
Syracuse, the number of commercial banking institu-
tions actually increased in three markets (Rochester,
Syracuse, and Metro New York–New Jersey). Similarly,
although the HHI based on all depository institutions
increased in the Buffalo and Rochester markets, the
commercial-bank-only HHI decreased in these markets.
The commercial-bank-only HHI increased only mod-
estly in the Syracuse and Metro markets, in contrast to
the steep increases for all depository institutions there.
In Albany, the one exception, the commercial-bank-
only HHI increased by 32 percent.5
3
Table 1
Changes in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and in the Number of Depository Institutions, 1989-94 
Based on Commercial Bank and Thrift Deposits
1989 1994 Percentage Change
Number of Number of Number of
Market HHI Institutions HHI Institutions HHI Institutions
Albany 759 38 1223 34 61 -11
Buffalo 1565 21 2003 17 28 -19
Metro New York–New Jersey 459 374 536 363 17  -3
Rochester 1113 33 1159 29 4 -12
Syracuse 1270 27 1570 27 24 0
National average 1423 N.A. 1602 N.A. 13           N.A.    
Source:  Authors’calculations, based on data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s 1989 and 1994 Summary of Deposits.
Notes:  The number of depository institutions is the number of commercial bank and thrift holding companies, independent commercial banks, and thrifts.
When calculating the HHI, we give thrifts’deposits half as much weight as commercial banks’deposits because banks offer a wider range of services.
The national average HHI is based on data at the metropolitan statistical area level.FRBNY 4
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Table 3
Changes in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and in the Number of Commercial Banking Institutions, 1989-94 
Based on Commercial Bank Deposits Only
1989 1994 Percentage Change
Number of Number of Number of
Market HHI Institutions HHI Institutions HHI Institutions
Albany 1358 20 1797 20 32 0
Buffalo 2494 14 2291 13 -8 -7
Metro New York–New Jersey 719 151 759 198 6 31
Rochester 1751 20 1448 21 -17 5
Syracuse 1879 14 1930 16 3 14
National average 1901 N.A. 1825 N.A. -4 N.A.
Source:  Authors’calculations, based on data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s 1989 and 1994 Summary of Deposits.
Notes:  The number of institutions equals the number of bank holding companies and independent banks. The national average HHI is based on data at the
metropolitan statistical area level.
Table 2
Sources of Consolidation, 1989-94
Panel A: Thrift Failures and Mergers
Decline in Number of Percentage Increase                  
Competitors Due to: in the HHI Due to:
Number of Thrift Thrift
Market Institutions Failures Mergers Failures Mergers
Albany 38 1 4 1 32
Buffalo 21 4 1 62 0
Metro New York–New Jersey 374 41 46 3 33
Rochester 33 4 1 3 0
Syracuse 27 2 3 7 1
Panel B: Withdrawals of Select New York City Institutions from Upstate New York Banking Markets
Number of Offices in Number of Upstate Markets in Which
Upstate New York Institutions Operate
Bank/Thrift 1989    1994              1989 1994
Bank of New York 67 0 4 0
Chase Manhattan 81 70 4 3
Chemical/Manufacturers Hanover 39 6 4 4
Citicorp 46 24 4 2
Dime Savings 17 0 1 0
Source:  Authors’calculations, based on data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s 1989 and 1994 Summary of Deposits. 
Notes:  The number of competitors equals the number of commercial bank and thrift holding companies, independent commercial banks, and thrifts.
When calculating the HHI, we give thrifts’deposits half as much weight as commercial banks’deposits because banks offer a wider range of services.
Upstate New York is defined as the four major markets:  Albany, Buffalo, Rochester, and Syracuse.
This table includes only those failures and mergers that reduced the number of competitors.  For example, failures or mergers in which the target institu-
tion was purchased by an out-of-market buyer entering the market as a result of the purchase are not counted since they do not reduce the number of com-
petitors. Moreover, this table accounts for only those institutions that existed in 1989 but not in 1994.  Thus, the table does not include failures, mergers,
or withdrawals of institutions that entered and exited these markets in interim years.
The HHIs are only approximations of the actual effects of mergers and failures. We assessed these effects by redistributing the target institutions’mar-
ket shares in 1989 to their acquirers and then recalculating the 1989 HHI for each market.  This procedure effectively treats all structural changes as hav-
ing occurred in 1989.  Although this approach will not yield exactly the HHI effects of mergers and thrift failures, any measurement errors would not
exaggerate or shrink the effects of mergers relative to the impact of thrift failures.
Bank Competition: Second District and National Trends
Concentration may not have increased rapidly among
commercial banks because midsized banks have main-
tained or even gained market share relative to the large
banks in the five markets (Table 4). To reach this con-
clusion, we identified large and midsized banks on the
basis of their deposit market shares in 1989, then
tracked these institutions to find their market shares in
1994. Large banks in each market were defined as
holding more than $500 million in deposits in that mar-ket in 1989, while midsized banks held deposits of
between $100 million and $500 million.6
We found that large banks lost market share between
1989 and 1994 in all markets except Albany. In the
Metro New York–New Jersey market, for example,
their share of deposits declined from 95 to 82 percent.
Midsized banks appear to have benefited from this
decline, increasing their market share substantially in
Buffalo, Rochester, and Metro New York–New Jersey.
In Syracuse, where midsized banks lost ground, large
banks also lost market share, suggesting that the small-
est banks or new market entrants gained ground over
this period. Large banks’decreasing market share sug-
gests they faced healthy competition from smaller
institutions, except in Albany.7
These trends contrast sharply with the national trend
toward larger banks’expansion primarily at the expense
of midsized banks. A study of nationwide banking by
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(Amel 1996) concluded that between 1984 and 1994,
large banks (deposits of more than $5 billion in 1984)
gained market share at the expense of midsized banks
($500 million-$5 billion in deposits) and small banks
(deposits of less than $500 million), with midsized
banks losing more ground than small banks. This find-
ing suggests a possible national trend toward a two-tier
bank structure dominated by a small number of large
banks and a large number of small banks—with mid-
sized banks maintaining only a small presence.
Using the same definition of bank sizes as the Board
study, we compared these national trends with changes
in the Metro market (Table 5).8 Nationally, midsized
banks lost over a third of their market share between
1989 and 1994. Large banks appear to have benefited,
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Table 4
Changes in Market Shares of Large 
and Midsized Banks, 1989-94
Percentage of Deposits at:
Large Banks Midsized Banks
Market 1989 1994 1989 1994
Albany 62 74 29 15
Buffalo 80 69 15 27
Metro New York–
New Jersey 95 82 4 13
Rochester 89 66 10 15
Syracuse 90 57 5 0
Source:  Authors’calculations, based on data from the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation’s 1989 and 1994 Summary of Deposits. 
Notes:  The 1994 deposit share figures are for the same institutions
identified as large or midsized on the basis of their 1989 deposits.
Banking institutions under common ownership are consolidated.
Table 5
Bank Consolidation Trends in the Second District
Metro Market and the Nation, 1989-94
Percentage Share of Percentage Share of
Metro Market Deposits National Deposits
Bank Size 
by Deposits 1989 1994 1989 1994
More than $5 billion  73 69 53 60
$500 million-$5 billion 21 23 22 16
Less than $500 million 6 8 25 24
Sources:  Amel (1996); authors’calculations, based on data from the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s 1989 and 1994 Summary of
Deposits. Additional data also provided by Amel.
Notes:  Banks under common ownership are consolidated. Size cate-
gories are defined in 1984 dollars. Although Amel tracks changes in
banking nationwide from 1984 to 1994, this table compares national
trends with Metro market trends only from 1989 to 1994 because
Metro market data are available only for this period.  
since they increased their share by about 13 percent;
small banks lost very little share. In the Metro market,
however, midsized and small banks gained market
share slightly at the expense of the largest banks. 
These opposing trends may be explained by the fact
that New York State allowed statewide branching in the
1970s while most states waited until the late 1980s to
do so. We suspect that when restrictions on branching
are lifted, midsized banks become the initial targets for
acquisition. Once the first wave of acquisitions is over,
the remaining midsized (and small) banks find market
segments where they can compete. In the 1980s, banks
nationwide were likely to be in the initial stage follow-
ing deregulation, when midsized banks typically lose
ground. The relatively mature Metro banking market, in
contrast, was at the stage when the remaining midsized
banks emerge as strong competitors. 
Conclusion
Our concentration measures suggest that Second District
banking markets experienced a significant increase in
market concentration between 1989 and 1994. Thrift
failures appear to have played an important role in this
process, increasing market concentration more than
bank mergers did in three of the five markets examined.
Merger activity, however, may drive consolidation in
the future. One sign of such a shift is the spate of large
mergers that occurred in the Second District in 1995.
Although a lack of up-to-date data prevents us from
exploring the 1995 developments in this article, prelim-
inary data suggest that merger activity in 1995
increased the HHI in the Metro New York–New Jersey
market substantially. Still, the market remains mostly
unconcentrated, with an HHI of less than 1000.   CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
The process of consolidation in Second District
banking markets may have improved the efficiency of
depository institutions, eliminated weaker banks, and
created better diversified institutions. Although contin-
ued consolidation may raise fears of decreased banking
competition, the growth of midsized banks’ market
share at the expense of large banks between 1989 and
1994 alleviates the concern that the District’s markets
will become excessively concentrated. Moreover, if
electronic banking and similar technologies allowing
banking over greater distances become more wide-
spread, local market concentration will have less of an
impact on competition because out-of-area banks will
be able to compete more effectively with local banks.
Notes
1. These markets account for 97 percent of the District’s transaction
deposits. We focus on 1989-94 because 1994 is the most recent year
for which deposit data are available and changes in banking market
definitions make comparisons of pre- and post-1989 data difficult.
Although the data in Tables 1-5 have not been adjusted for slight
market redefinitions between 1989 and 1994, controlling for them
does not change our conclusions qualitatively. 
2. Failure is defined as insolvency and closure involving interven-
tion by a banking regulator. Mergers of troubled institutions without
regulatory intervention are considered mergers rather than failures.
3. New York City institutions withdrew from upstate New York mar-
kets by selling branches in these areas. Thus, these withdrawals are
not counted in bank and thrift mergers in upstate markets.     
4. The four banks listed were among the top five retail banks in the
New York Metro market as of 1989; Dime Savings was the largest
thrift in the Metro market. 
5. The sharp increase is largely due to the expansion of a single
institution, which increased its share of deposits significantly
between 1989 and 1994.
6. Our definitions of bank size were based on the local deposit
holdings of banks, not on bank-level deposit holdings. For example,
although money center banks had total deposits far in excess of
$500 million in 1989, they were not classified as large in some
upstate markets if they did not have more than $500 million in
deposits in those markets.  
7. As an alternative exercise, we compared the market share of the
top three market-share holders with that of the next three 
market-share holders in each market in 1989 and 1994. The gap
between market shares of the top-tier and mid-tier banks is a stan-
dard indicator of concentration. During the 1989-94 period, the gap
narrowed in Buffalo, Rochester, and Metro New York, indicating
that midsized banks grew faster than the largest banks. (For the
Metro New York market, we compared the largest fifteen banks
with the next largest fifteen banks because of the substantially
larger number of banks in this market.) For Syracuse, the gap
widened but only moderately, while for Albany, the gap widened
significantly, consistent with every other measure of concentration
for this market.
8. We did not compare the national trends with changes in the
upstate markets, because these markets have no banks with more
than $5 billion in local deposits. Therefore, we could not reproduce
the Board of Governors analysis for these markets. 
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